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UNDESIRABLE USES
Municipalities have increasingly resorted to zoning, the primary
mechanism for local regulation of land use and development,' to ex-
clude uses that the community feels are "undesirable."2 Using the
common law police power to zone for the general welfare,3 local gov-
ernments have classified adult entertainment establishments, abor-
tion clinics, and community group homes4 as undesirable land uses.5
Zoning ordinances exclude adult entertainment establishments and
abortion clinics from business districts, and exclude group homes
from residential areas. Although reasons differ for excluding each
use, one common concern is the detrimental impact of the offending
use on property values.6 A court's response to this concern depends
on the amount of proof that property values will indeed suffer. The
1. Yohalem, Exclusionary Zoning, reprinted in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, LE-
GAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1673, 1675 (1979) (each state has
either enabling legislation or state constitutional provisions granting to municipalities
the power to zone).
2. See generally Marcus, Zoning Obscenity: Or, The Moral Politics of Porn, 27
BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1978) (a growing recognition of inability ofjudges to distinguish
obscenity as well as public outcry has led to restrictive zoning to regulate
pornography).
3. See I R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 1.14 (2d ed. 1976); Chan-
dler & Ross, Zoning Restrictions and the Right to Live in the Community, reprinted in
THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 311 (M. Kindred, ed. 1976) (state
enabling legislation generally does not have clear substantive standards and requires
only that zoning ordinances prohibit things which are harmful to health, morals,
safety, or welfare).
4. Community group homes are generally non-secure residential programs that
emphasize family-style living in a home-like atmosphere. They are usually operated
by non-profit corporations, government agencies, or private persons. See Legal Issues
in State Mental Health Care: Proposals for Change, Zoning for Community Resi-
dences, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 316 (1977).
5. Another land use that has been litigated over as undesirable is land used for
halfway houses for drug addicts or prisoners. These cases have generally been treated
similar to group home cases. See City of Dallas v. Turtle Creek Manor, Inc., 546
S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
6. See Note, Zoning for the Mentally Ill: 4 Legislative Mandate, 16 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 853, 860 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Zoningfor the Mentally Ill]. See also D.
LAUBER & F. BANGS, ZONING FOR FAMILY AND GROUP CARE FACILITIES 8-10 (Am.
Soc'y of Planning Officials Planning Advisory Serv. Rep. No. 300, 1974), citedin Lip-
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main issue in adult entertainment establishment cases is the impact of
zoning ordinances on constitutionally protected speech. Controver-
sies over abortion clinic zoning also involve a constitutional right-
the right of privacy in obtaining an abortion. Litigation over com-
munity group homes, however, generally focuses on state law issues,
as the homes try to qualify within the existing zoning structure.
I. ADULT ENTERTAINMENT ESTABLISHMENTS
As the number of adult bookstores, theaters, and live nude dancing
establishments has grown, so has the amount of litigation over these
businesses. The public, indignant at the proliferation of adult en-
tertainment land uses and upset over their destructive impact on
property values,7 has tried to regulate their location through exclu-
sionary zoning.8 Cities attempting to revitalize downtown areas often
try to disperse adult entertainment establishments in order to prevent
an overconcentration in the redevelopment areas.9 Courts faced with
challenges to these ordinances must deal with the first amendment's
protection of pornographic, but not obscene, communication.'
0
In Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc. 11 the Supreme Court up-
held Detroit's anti-skid row ordinance. It denied conditional use per-
mits to any adult use that was located within 500 feet of a residential
district or within 100 feet of any other adult use. The lower court
declared the 500 foot limitation invalid as a prior restraint on
speech. 2 A plurality of the Supreme Court found that Detroit's in-
terest in protecting the quality of urban life outweighed the plaintiff's
first amendment rights.' 3 Although the first amendment protects por-
pincott, '4 Sanctuary for People" Strategies/or Overcoming Zoning Restrictions on
Community Homesfor Retarded Persons, 31 STAN. L. REv. 767, 769 (1979).
7. Marcus, supra note 2, at 1.
8. Id Exclusionary zoning is a method whereby a municipality either fails to pro-
vide a zone for a particular use or specifically prohibits the use. 2 R. ANDERSON,
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, §§ 8.01-8.31 (2d ed. 1977).
9. See Marcus, supra note 2, at 4.
10. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
11. Id
12. Nortown Theatre, Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Mich. 1974), rev'd
sub nom. American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'd
sub nom. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). The 500 foot
requirement was not challenged on appeal.
13. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 62-63. See also Com-
ment, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 495, 498 (1981).
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nographic communication from total suppression, the plurality al-
lowed the state to regulate it to a greater extent than other types of
speech. 4
Justice Powell, concurring, disagreed with the plurality's implica-
tion that non-obscene, erotic materials may be treated differently
under the first amendment than other types of non-commercial
speech.I5 Justice Powell found instead that the ordinance did not im-
pose any content limitation on the creators of adult movies, did not
make them less available, and did not restrict access to the movies in
any significant way. 6 The Detroit zoning ordinance was merely a
restriction on the location of adult establishments, not on the content
of their communication.17
Cases interpreting Young have generally followed the Powell con-
currence. 8 The Seventh Circuit used Justice Powel's analysis'9 to
invalidate a zoning ordinance requiring a special use permit for
14. 427 U.S. at 70-7 1. See Note, Zoning Control ofAbortion Clinics, 28 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 507, 523 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Zoning Control].
15. 427 U.S. at 73 n.l (Powell, J. concurring). Motion pictures are fully within the
protection of the first amendment. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-
03 (1952).
16. 427 U.S. at 78 (Powell, J. concurring).
17. Id at 78-79.
18. See Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207, 1223 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
(followed Justice Powell's emphasis concerning the fact that the Detroit ordinance did
not restrict public access to communication; Atlanta's ordinance differed); Borrago v.
City of Louisville, 456 F. Supp. 30 (W.D. Ky. 1978) (ordinance regulating adult
materials justified under the Powell analysis in Young since it furthered important
and substantial interests); Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696, 702
(M.D. Fla. 1978) (under the plurality and concurring opinions in Young, the denial of
access to the adult entertainment market would eliminate a crucial underpinning of
the validity of the Detroit zoning scheme); Kacar, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Al-
lentown,-Pa. Comnw.-, 432 A.2d 310, 313 (1981) (under the Powell analysis, the
legitimate state interest furthered by the government action outweighed the individual
rights; ordinance regulated a economic exploitation and location of certain films and
books).
19. Justice Powell had used the test in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968). Under that test, a government regulation is sufficiently justified despite its
incidental impact on first amendment interests if the regulation is within the constitu-
tional power of the government, if it furthers an important or substantive government
interest, if the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression,
and if the incidental restriction on first amendment freedoms is not greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest. See County of Cook v. World Wide News
Agency, 98 11. App. 3d 1094, 424 N.E.2d 1173, 1176 (1981) (statement of the test).
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"adult" movie theaters.2" The court found that the ordinance was a
prior restraint on protected communication since it impermissibly
classified speech based on content.21 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit, in
Bayou Landing v. Walls,22 found that when a municipality bases the
denial of an occupancy permit on the content of objectionable mater-
ials, it has the burden of demonstrating that the restraint scrupulously
comports with the most rigorous procedural safeguards.2 3
The Young Court placed considerable emphasis on Detroit's justi-
fication for the zoning ordinance.24 It is important, therefore, that
the municipality clearly set out the reasons for its action. In E & B
Enterfprises v. City of University Park,25 the city offered no studies of
the effect of adult uses on town neighborhoods. Evidence showed
that community objection to the content of the adult films prompted
the exclusionary zoning.2 6 The court distinguished Young on these
factors and invalidated the ordinance. Courts generally hold vague
or overbroad ordinances to be a prior restraint on speech,27 and use a
20. Entertainment Concepts, Inc. v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981).
21. Id at 503.
22. 563 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 818 (1978).
23. Id at 1176. Conditional use permit requirements pose a threat to the validity
of zoning ordinances if the standards for granting a permit are not sufficiently clear.
See County of Cook v. World Wide News Agency, 98 IU. App. 3d 1094, 424 N.E.2d
1173, 1177 (1981) (Ordinance requiring that every operator of an adult bookstore
obtain a special use permit from the County Board regardless of the store's proximity
to another regulated use was a prior restraint on speech. The County Board had
unbridled discretion to grant or deny the permit); City of Imperial Beach v. Palm
Avenue Books, Inc., 115 Cal. App. 3d 134, 171 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1981); Note, Abortion
Clinic Zoning: The Right to Procreative Freedom and the Zoning Power, 5 WOMEN'S
RIGHTS L. RaP. 283, 295 (1980) (zoning must be based on a legislative determination
rather ihan the popularity of certain activities) [hereinafter cited as Abortion Clinic
Zoning].
24. The Detroit Common Council made a specific finding that these uses of prop-
erty were especially injurious to neighborhoods when concentrated in limited areas.
427 U.S. at 54. Urban planners and real estate experts stated that the location of
several such businesses in the same neighborhood tended to adversely affect property
values, cause an increase in crime, and encourage residents and businesses to move
elsewhere. Id at 55.
25. 449 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
26. Id at 696. The neighborhood preservation rationale was merely a mask to
cover an attempt to run the theater out of town. Town disapproval of the content of
the theater's films and the effect on speech were highly significant. Id at 697.
27. Eg.g, Entertainment Concepts, Inc. v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir.
[Vol. 23:467
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strict scrutiny analysis to strike them down.2" A Michigan court, in
Ferndale v. Ealand,29 applied strict scrutiny in finding that a city had
not demonstrated a compelling governmental interest in the regula-
tion of adult entertainment facilities.3" In Purple Onion v. Jackson3 1
the City of Atlanta attempted to justify its Adult Entertainment Zon-
ing Ordinance as a measure to prevent blight and to protect property
values.32 The court used Powelrs analysis to find the ordinance's
definitions of "adult book store," "adult theater," and "adult en-
tertainment establishment" unconstitutionally vague33 and over-
broad.3 ' The distance limitations imposed were far greater than
necessary to serve the city's interest in reducing the effects of adult
business."
1980) cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981); E & B Enterprises v. City of University Park,
449 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
28. Entertainment Concepts, Inc. v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d at 501-02; E & B En-
terprises v. City of University Park, 449 F. Supp. at 697.
29. 92 Mich. App. 88, 286 N.W.2d 688 (1979).
30. Id at 691. The effect of the particular restriction was almost a total ban on
the facilities. See also Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203 (7th Cir. 1980) (parts
of ordinance invalid as a prior restraint on speech).
31. 511 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
32. Id at 1210. The Atlanta Adult Entertainment Zoning Ordinance was enacted
by the city council to establish locational requirements for adult businesses. The
council found that adult businesses blight and downgrade property values when lo-
cated in business districts; cause traffic congestion in already concentrated areas of the
city; require extra police and fire protection from the city; and create excessive noise,
causing surrounding property and those nearby to suffer. Id
33. Id at 1218. For other cases holding ordinances void for vagueness, see En-
tertainment Concepts, Inc. v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 919 (1981) (adult movie ordinance was vague since there was no definition of
"adult") and Pringle v. City of Covina, 115 Cal. App. 3d 151, 171 Cal. Rptr. 251
(1981) (definition of adult movie theatre contained vague statutory language; statute
was construed narrowly so that it did not apply to plaintiff). But see Basiardanes v.
City of Galveston, 514 F. Supp. 975 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (definition of adult motion pic-
ture theater not unconstitutionally vague); Northend Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle,
90 Wash. 2d 709, 585 P.2d 1153 (1978) (ordinance requiring all adult movie theaters
to be located in certain downtown areas not void for vagueness).
34. 511 F. Supp. at 1221. See also Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor,
657 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1981) (ordinance that effectively zoned adult theaters from the
town was void as overbroad); E & B Enterprises v. City of University Park, 449 F.
Supp. 695 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (city ordinance that in effect required adult theater to
change type of film it showed or move out of city violated equal protection and was
overbroad). But see Northend Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 709, 585
P.2d 1153 (1978) (ordinance not overbroad).
35. 511 F. Supp. at 1227. The adult uses were restricted to three zoning districts
1982]
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In Young, the plurality noted that although Detroit could constitu-
tionally regulate the geographical placement of adult entertainment
establishments within its jurisdiction,36 "the situation would be quite
different if the ordinance had the effect of suppressing, or greatly re-
stricting access to lawful speech."37 Accordingly, many courts have
upheld zoning ordinances that merely impose restrictions on the loca-
tion of adult establishments.38 The closer an ordinance approaches a
total ban on the adult use, however, the more likely a court will strike
it down.39 In Bayside Enterprises v. Carson,40 the city of Jacksonville,
Florida imposed such restrictive distance limitations that no pro-
posed adult use could comply with them.41 The court focused on the
effect of the limitations on the exercise of first amendment rights.42
Here, unlike Young, the ordinance precluded access to the adult en-
tertainment market,43 thereby unlawfully suppressing speech.
44
and limited to 1000 feet from any other adult use, and 500 feet from any residential
district. The court found that of 81 sites for adult uses suggested by the city, all but 10
or so were wholly unacceptable as sites for adult businesses. Id at 1216.
36. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 71-73.
37. Id at 71 n.35.
38. See Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 555 (8th Cir. 1981) (city
ordinance prohibiting adult movies within 100 yards of a church, public or private
school or residential area a valid exercise of city's police power); Walnut Properties,
Inc. v. Long Beach City Council, 100 Cal. App. 3d 1018, 161 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980) (ordinance passed to insure that adult entertainment
businesses will not contribute to blighting or downgrading of the surrounding neigh-
borhoods did not restrict access to the adult movie market); Dandy Co., Inc. v. South
Bend, 75 Ind. Dec. 98, 401 N.E.2d 1380 (1980) (zoning ordinance did not prohibit
plaintiff from operating an adult bookstore); Northend Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle,
90 Wash. 2d 709, 585 P.2d 1153 (1978), cert. deniedsub nom. Apple Theatre, Inc. v.
Seattle, 441 U.S. 946 (1979) (ordinance requiring all adult movie theaters to be lo-
cated in certain downtown areas justified by a study of need for zoning of adult thea-
ters which cited specific concerns).
39. See Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Bay-
side Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696 (M.D. Fla. 1978); City of Ferndale
v. Ealand, 92 Mich. App. 88, 286 N.W.2d 688 (1979).
40. 450 F. Supp. 696 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
41. The distance limitations were 2500 feet from a church or school, 2500 feet
from another adult use, and 500 feet from a residential district. Id at 701-02.
42. Id at 702.
43. Id The ordinance contained a grandfather clause allowing currently operat-
ing establishments to continue in their present locations. Id at 702 n.9.
44. Id at 703. See also Marco Lounge, Inc. v. City of Federal Heights,-Colo.-,
625 P.2d 982 (1981) (en banc) (zoning ordinance that effectively banned all live nude
entertainment was invalidated).
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The United States Supreme Court recently considered a total ban
on live entertainment in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ehraim.45 The
ordinance in question purported to list all permitted uses in the bor-
ough's commercial district, adding that all uses not expressly permit-
ted were prohibited.46  The operators of an adult bookstore were
found guilty in criminal court of violating the ordinance. They had
allowed a customer to watch live nude dancing from behind a glass
panel. The state court expressly found that the ordinance validly for-
bade live entertainment in any establishment.47 The Supreme Court
reversed the convictions and struck down the ordinance.
The Court stated that by excluding all live entertainment, Mount
Ephraim prohibited protected expression without justifying such a
broad exclusion.48 The Court recognized municipal power to control
land use, but held that zoning laws that infringe on protected liberties
must be narrowly drawn and must further a sufficiently substantial
governmental interest.49 The Supreme Court thus implicitly en-
dorsed the Powell analysis in Young,5" and followed the line of lower
court cases using a strict scrutiny test." Schad, then, was a logical
extension of Young, since Young warned that if the ordinance had
the effect of totally suppressing or greatly restricting access to speech,
the Court would hold differently 2 Since Mount Ephraim could
45. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
46. Id at 63-64. Some permitted uses were offices, banks, taverns, restaurants,
retail stores, repair shops, cleaners and motels.
47. Id at 64-65. The Supreme Court stated that it was bound by state court inter-
pretation of the local ordinance. Id at 65.
48. Id at 67. There was no justification on the face of the ordinance. Id
49. Id. at 68-70.
50. In a footnote, the Court cited the test Justice Powell used in Young. Id. at 68
n.7.
51. For lower federal court decisions applying strict scrutiny analysis see Keego
Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1981); Bayside Enterprises
v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696 (M.D. Fla. 1978); E & B Enterprises v. City of University
Park, 449 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Tex. 1977); City of Imperial Beach v. Palm Avenue
Books, 115 Cal. App. 3d 134, 171 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1981); City of Ferndale v. Ealand, 92
Mich. App. 88, 286 N.W.2d 688 (1979).
The ordinance in Schad was also invalid as a time, place, and manner restriction.
The borough could not identify why it was reasonable to exclude all commercial live
entertainment while allowing a variety of other commercial uses. The borough was
unable to show that live entertainment was incompatible with uses presently permit-
ted. Additionally, there were no open adequate alternative channels of communica-
tion. 452 U.S. at 74-76.
52. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 71 n.35.
1982]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
have employed a less restrictive alternative to further its interest, the
ordinance failed.53
Schad probably will not put an end to litigation over zoning and
adult uses because zoning ordinances vary so widely. Schad will,
however, put municipalities on notice that they must draw ordinances
narrowly, and support them with sufficient justification to pass consti-
tutional muster. The effect of Schad on future adult use cases may be
limited by the extent of Mount Ephraim's prohibition of live en-
tertainment, and the inadequacy of the borough's justifications for
the ban.54 The zoning authority never arrived at a defensible conclu-
sion that live entertainment presented unusual problems for the
community.55
Schad emphasizes the need for sufficient objective data to justify
adult use restrictions. Following Schad, the Sixth Circuit in Keego
Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor56 invalidated an ordinance that
effectively banned adult uses. In addition to distance requirements,
the ordinance required permission of the city council and planning
commission for a permit.57 The court interpreted Schad as demand-
ing that a city provide "sufficient justification" for imposing a burden
on the first amendment.58 The city in Keego Harbor attempted to
justify the restrictions as necessary to prevent blight and to control
53. 452 U.S. at 74.
54. Mount Ephraim did not articulate the justifications for the ban. The borough
asserted the following justifications for the ordinance: (1) that live entertainment
would conflict with the borough's plan to create a commercial area that catered only
to the immediate needs of its residents and (2) to avoid problems that may be associ-
ated with live entertainment, such as parking, trash, police protection and medical
facilities. Id at 72-73.
55. Id at 73. Justice Powell concurred on the ground that Mount Ephraim
"failed altogether to justify its broad restriction of protected expression." Id. at 79.
Justice Stevens also agreed that the borough had the burden of showing that the intro-
duction of live entertainment had an adverse impact on the neighborhood or borough
as a whole. Interestingly, Justice Stevens, author of the Young plurality, added that
when first amendment interests are implicated, the borough must demonstrate that a
"uniform policy in fact exists and is applied in a content neutral fashion." Id at 84.
This seems to contradict his implied holding in Young, that classifications of speech
based on content would be permissible.
56. 657 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1981).
57. Id at 96 n.l. See also County of Cook v. World Wide News Agency, 98 111.
App. 3d 1094,424 N.E.2d 1173 (1981) (special use permit requirement in zoning ordi-
nance was a prior restraint).
58. 657 F.2d at 97. The city had to establish that the restrictions were necessary to
meet delineated city goals. Id
[Vol. 23:467
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traffic. 9 The city, however, had no objective information on the
claimed harm at the time of the ordinance's enactment.60 The court
found insufficient grounds to support an ordinance which in effect
banned all adult theaters.6 Keego Harbor clearly imposes burdens
of practical proof on municipalities that infringe on protected areas
of communication.
II. ABORTION CLINICS
Community sentiments against abortion often lead to zoning ordi-
nances that discriminate against abortion clinics. Unlike adult use
restrictions, however, municipalities in abortion clinic cases cannot
claim that their ordinances fulfill the valid zoning objective of neigh-
borhood preservation. An abortion clinic is practically indistin-
guishable from other medical outpatient clinics.63 Furthermore the
constitutional obstacle in these cases arises not from freedom of
speech but from a woman's fundamental right of privacy. '
In Framingham Clinic v. Board of Selectmen65 the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts invalidated a zoning bylaw which pro-
hibited abortion clinics while allowing other types of medical clinics.
The court found that the ordinance unconstitutionally interfered with
the right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy during the first tri-
mester.66 Although a woman seeking an abortion could go to a hos-
pital, the court found that this would "burden arbitrarily the
constitutional right"67 because the purpose of the clinic was to pro-
vide low cost, outpatient service. The board's mere authority to zone,
without some compelling governmental interest, could not justify sin-
59. Id at 98.
60. Id
61. Id at 97-98. The court added that it was "not immediately apparent as a
matter of experience" that adult movie theaters would have a deleterious effect on a
town that already had many bars and few of the attributes of a quiet residential com-
munity. Id at 98.
62. See Zoning Control supra note 14, at 527.
63. Abortion Clinic Zoning, supra note 23, at 286.
64. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of privacy encompasses a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate pregnancy). See Abortion Clinic Zoning, supra
note 23, at 291-92.
65. 373 Mass. 279, 367 N.E.2d 606 (1977).
66. Id. at 283, 367 N.E.2d at 609.
67. id. In addition one community could not ban clinics simply because they
were available in the next town. Id
19821
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gling out one type of clinic.68
Discrimination against a particular clinic also may supply grounds
to strike down an ordinance. In Planned Parenthood of Minnesota v.
Citizens/or Community Action 69 the zoning ordinance directly pre-
vented the opening of a specific clinic.7" When the prospective clinic
operator-a family planning organization-sought a preliminary in-
junction against enforcement of the ordinance, a neighborhood asso-
ciation moved to intervene.71 The neighborhood association claimed
an interest in preserving property values as grounds for intervention,
and presented a real estate expert who testified that an abortion clinic
would lower residential and community property values in the imme-
diate area.72 Nevertheless, the Planned Parenthood established the
requirements for a permanent injunction by showing that the ordi-
nance, aimed primarily at the organization's proposed clinic, inter-
fered with women's right to secure a first trimester abortion.7 3 The
court emphasized that "[t]here is no judicial authority allowing a mu-
nicipality, by imposing special restrictive zoning requirements on first
trimester abortion clinics, to do indirectly that which it cannot do
directly by medical regulation."
74
One district court looked at the zoning of abortion clinics in a dif-
68. Id. at 287, 367 N.E.2d at 611. See Fox Valley Reproductive Health Care
Center, Inc. v. Arft, 446 F. Supp. 1072 (E.D. Wis. 1978). The ordinance in Fox Valley
effectuated a total ban on abortion clinics. The court found that the cost of bringing
the clinic in compliance with the various regulations would force the clinic to raise the
abortion fee so high that it would be beyond the economic means of poor women.
446 F. Supp. at 1074. See also Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Northwest Indiana v.
Town of Merrillville, No. 78-70 (N.D. Ind. April 20, 1978) (ordinance preventing the
construction and operation of an abortion clinic in a zone permitting business and
commercial uses enjoined); Fox Hill Surgery Clinic, Inc. v. City of Overland Park,
No. 77-4120 (E.D. Kan. July 11, 1977) (city ordered to issue building permits to abor-
tion clinic). Cases summarized in 4 ABORTION L. REP., Zoning § 10.1, citedin.4bor-
tion Clinic Zoning, supra note 23, at 292 n.81.
69. 558 F.2d 861 (8th Cir. 1977).
70. Id at 867. The city council had not previously attempted to restrict abortion
operations until Planned Parenthood bought the land and planned to transfer its op-
erations. Id at 863-74.
71. Id at 869.
72. Id Thus, the court allowed the association to intervene. The association had
significant protectable interest in the subject matter of the litigation. Id
73. Id at 866. SeeAbortion Clinic Zoning, supra note 23, at 291-292 (use compel-
ling state interest test when a zoning classification contravenes a fundamental right).
74. 558 F.2d at 868. The zoning ordinance was only a disguised attempt to regu-
late medical practices.
[Vol. 23:467
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ferent light. In West Side Women's Services v. City of Cleveland,75 the
court allowed a city to ban abortion clinics from certain areas of the
city. The court found that the ordinance did not unduly burden the
abortion decision or the physician-patient relationship.76 The city
did not impose a total ban of abortion clinics from an entire political
subdivision thus giving women access to abortion clinics in other ar-
eas of the city. 7 7 The court disregarded the discriminatory motiva-
tion of the ordinance.7' The city justified the ordinance as a proper
exercise of the police power.7 9 The court thus allowed a zoning clas-
sification based on anti-abortion sentiments.
If there is no overt discriminatory action against an abortion clinic,
courts may be more willing to uphold a zoning ordinance. They will
probably uphold an ordinance regulating all clinics, which is not a
response to an abortion clinic's attempt to locate in the community."0
The abortion clinic would simply have to qualify under the existing
rules.
Still another method municipalities use to exclude abortion clinics
is the requirement of a special use permit. If the town already allows
professional offices or other medical clinics, it must show some real
distinction between abortion clinics and other clinics to justify ex-
cluding only abortion clinics. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts disapproved of the excessive amount of discretion involved
in the special permit process in the recent case Framingham Clinic v.
Zoning Board ofAppeals."' The court found that an abortion clinic
was a permitted use as a "professional office." The personal opinion
75. 450 F. Supp 796 (N.D. Ohio 1978), aft'dmem., 582 F.2d 1281 (6th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied 439 U.S. 983 (1978).
76. Id at 798.
77. Id The court essentially followed the same rationale as the Young plurality.
78. For a criticism of West Side Women's Services, see Zoning Control, supra note
14, at 522.
79. 450 F. Supp. at 797. The city argued that the ordinance did not interfere with
a fundamental constitutional right so must be judged by a rational basis test. Id
80. See Bossier City Medical Suite, Inc. v. City of Bossier City, 483 F. Supp. 633
(W.D. La. 1980). No clinics that allowed "major surgery" were allowed in the dis-
trict. The court refused to apply strict scrutiny to the ordinance, although plaintiff
argued that traditional deference to zoning should not apply when the ordinance in-
fringed on a fundamental right. The court added that, "A commercial enterprise can-
not disregard the land use regulations of a valid zoning ordinance merely because its
customers are exercising a fundamental right." Id at 647-48.
81. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 109, 415 N.E.2d 840 (1981) (excessive amount of discre-
tion invited an abuse of discretion).
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of a zoning administrator whether the use promoted "life" as stated
in the bylaw's purposes was irrelevant.82
In abortion clinic zoning cases thus far, none have proved a causal
relationship between the operation of an abortion clinic and an unde-
sirable community effect.83 The prohibition then would lack a ra-
tional basis and may be a violation of substantive due process 84 or
equal protection.85 Local governments have tried to use zoning, nev-
ertheless, as a tool to effectuate sentiment against abortion. Courts
faced with these cases are reluctant to allow community values
against a fundamental right to influence land use. Since the abortion
decision is protected by the right of privacy, the right should be be-
yond the reach of the police power86 without a compelling govern-
mental interest.
Courts may uphold more carefully drafted ordinances. Such an
ordinance would distinguish between abortion clinics and other types
of clinics on an empirical basis. Proof of harm to property values or
traffic control problems combined with a well drafted ordinance will
advance the validity of the ordinance. If the zoning plan establishes
less than a total ban on abortion clinics in the city, it will also stand
on more solid ground. Recently enacted ordinances have been pri-
marily emotional reactions to planned abortion clinics and have not
achieved the sophistication of adult entertainment regulations.
87
With growing opposition to abortion and increasing influence of anti-
abortion groups, cities will draft careful, narrow zoning ordinances-
ordinances that courts will be more likely to uphold.
III. COMMUNITY GROUP HOMES
Community group homes88 include homes for foster children, the
mentally retarded, and juvenile delinquents. Group homes are an
integral part of the de-institutionalization process,89 which involves
82. 415 N.E.2d at 848.
83. See Zoning Control, supra note 14, at 526.
84. See Abortion Clinic Zoning, supra note 23, at 291.
85. Id at 291-292.
86. See Zoning Control, supra note 14, at 527.
87. But f E & B Enterprises v. City of University Park, 449 F. Supp. 695 (N.D.
Tex. 1977) (exclusion of adult theater based on community reaction overturned). See
note 26 and accompanying text supra.
88. See note 4 supra.
89. See Note, Group House of Port Washington v. Board of Zoning and Appeals:
[Vol. 23:467
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol23/iss1/18
ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
not only placing the developmentally disabled 90 in more normal en-
vironments, but treating them as much like the rest of society as pos-
sible. Group homes, which emphasize family-style living, 9 are best
located in residential areas.92 Neighbors present substantial opposi-
tion to efforts to establish group homes in residential areas.93 Local
residents view group homes as mini-institutions causing concern over
safety, traffic, noise levels, and property values. 94 Recent studies in-
dicate, however, that group homes have no significant negative im-
pact.95 Unlike adult entertainment establishments and abortion
clinics, states have promoted group homes by enacting legislation
limiting the effect of local zoning restrictions.
96
Encroachment of Community Residences into Single Family Districts, 43 ALB. L. REV.
539, 542 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Encroachment].
A federal report has defined the term in the mental health field as "[tlhe process of
(1) preventing both unnecessary admission to and retention in institutions, and
(2) finding and developing appropriate alternatives in the community for housing,
treatment, training, education, and rehabilitation of the mentally disabled." Comp-
troller General Report to Congress, Returning the Mentally Disabled to the Community:
Government Needs to Do More (Jan. 1, 1977), quoted in 16 HARV. J. LEGIS., supra
note 4, at 855.
90. The above definition of deinstitutionalization applies equally as well to
juveniles. Unless otherwise specified, all references to "developmentally disabled"
refer collectively to the mentally ill, mentally retarded, delinquent, dependent and
neglected children. For a discussion of deinstitutionalization see Encroachment, supra
note 89; Comment, Exclusionary Zoning and its Effects on Group Homes in Areas
Zonedfor Single Family Dwellings, 24 KAN. L. REV. 677, 679-81 (1976).
91. See Legal Issues in State Mental Health Care: Proposals for Change, Zoning
for Community Residences, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 316 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Legal Issues].
92. COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION FOR CORRECTIONS OF THE AMERICAN
CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE RESIDENTIAL
SERVICES foreward at xxi (1974).
93. These districts offer the highest form of protection to a homeowner when lim-
ited to single family detached residences. Single family districts are generally upheld
on the ground that they promote legitimate zoning purposes: advancement of family
and youth values, alleviation of congestion, and population density control. See Car-
roll v. Washington Township Zoning Comm'n, 63 Ohio St. 2d 249, 252, 408 N.E.2d
191, 193 (1980); Encroachment, supra note 89, at 539.
94. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
95. See Legal Issues, supra note 91, at 320; Developmental Disabilities State Leg-
islative Project of the ABA Commission on the Mentally Disabled, Zoningfor Com-
munity Homes, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 794, 795 (1978); Yohalem, supra note
1, at 1685 (citing studies which find that property values do not decrease when a
group home moves into a neighborhood).
96. See note 127 and accompanying text infra.
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Zoning ordinances that exclude group homes from residential
areas vary in type. Some ordinances explicitly exclude the homes,
classifying them as businesses, schools, or boarding houses. Others
exclude them implicitly by limiting residential areas to single family
dwellings. Still other ordinances allow group homes only if they
meet conditions imposed on special or conditional use permits.
97
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,9s the Supreme Court sustained
an ordinance which prohibited more than two unrelated persons
from living together in a single family residence. The Court found
the ordinance reasonable and rationally related to the permissible
state objective of forestalling density problems. 99 Belle Terre in-
volved groups of college students rather than group homes. The New
Jersey Supreme Court, however, in State v. Baker,"° held unconsti-
tutional an ordinance that prohibited more than four unrelated indi-
viduals from sharing a single housing unit. The Supreme Court of
California also invalidated a similar ordinance in Santa Barbara v.
Adamson.10t The state courts found the ordinances not pertinent to
noise, traffic, parking congestion or kinds of activity that might alter
land use characteristics or the environment of the district.'"2 Penn-
sylvania courts have also effectively distinguished the factual situa-
tion in Belle Terre"°3 in finding limitations on the number of
unrelated individuals unconstitutional. °4
Within single family district zoning ordinances there is wide varia-
97. Yohalem, supra note 1, at 1676. Conditions imposed generally include com-
pliance with elaborate building codes and restrictions on the number of residents al-
lowed in the home. Id
98. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
99. Id at 8-9.
100. 81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368 (1979). See also Berger v. State, 71 N.J. 206, 364
A.2d 993 (1976) (restrict single family dwellings only to a reasonable number of per-
sons who constitute a bonafide single housekeeping unit).
101. 27 Cal. 3d 123, 132, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 544, 610 P.2d 436, 441 (1980).
102. See also City of Chula Vista v. Pagard, 115 Cal. App. 3d 785, 171 Cal. Rptr.
738 (1981).
103. Belle Terre involved college students who had housing alternatives.
104. Christ United Methodist Church v. Bethel Park, 55 Pa. Commw. 365, 423
A.2d 1082 (1980); Children's Home of Easton v. City of Easton, 53 Pa. Commw. 216,
417 A.2d 830 (1980) (although population density control was a legitimate zoning
interest, there was no logical distinction between three unrelated children in a foster
home and three related by blood or adoption). The court in Children's Home dist-
inguished Belle Terre finding the factual difference between foster families and the six
unrelated college students too vast. 53 Pa. Commw. at 220, 417 A.2d at 832.
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tion. Some require only that the occupants form a "single house-
keeping unit,"' °5 while others attempt to define "family."' 10 6
Interpretations of the latter type of ordinance often rely on an ex-
panded use of the term "family" to allow group homes entry into the
district.' 7 In City of White Plains v. Ferraioli,'0° the New York
Court of Appeals held that a group home consisting of a married
couple, their two children, and their foster children qualified as a sin-
gle family unit. As long as the home bore the generic character of a
family unit maintained as a relatively permanent household it con-
formed to the ordinance.' 9
A notable exception to the trend of expanding the definition of
family to include group homes illustrates the weakness of this ap-
105. Single family districts offer the highest form of protection to a homeowner
when limited to single family detached residences. Single family districts are gener-
ally upheld on the ground that they promote legitimate zoning purposes: advance-
ment of family and youth values, alleviation of congestion, and population density
control. See Carroll v. Washington Township Zoning Comm'n, 63 Ohio St. 2d 249,
252, 408 N.E.2d 191, 193 (1980); Encroachment, supra note 89, at 539.
In City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 304, 313 N.E.2d 756, 757, 357
N.Y.S.2d 449, 451 (1974), the principle permitted uses in the ordinance were for a
"single family dwelling for one housekeeping unit."
106. See Group House of Port Washington, Inc. v. Board of Zoning and Appeals
of North Hempstead, 45 N.Y.2d 266, 380 N.E.2d 207, 408 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1978), where
the zoning ordinance defined family as "one or more persons related by blood, mar-
riage or legal adoption residing or cooking or warming food as a single housekeeping
unit." Id at 270, 380 N.E.2d at 208, 408 N.Y.S. at 378.
107. See Robertson v. Western Baptist Hospital, 267 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Ky. 1954)
(word "family" is an elastic term, often given broad meaning; it may mean a collec-
tion of persons living together in a home, although none are married). Accord, Brady
v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 77, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242, 247 (1962) ("family"
means living as a family); Carroll v. City of Miami Beach, 198 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Bellarmine Hills Ass'n v. Residential Systems Co., 84 Mich.
App. 554, 560, 269 N.W.2d 673, 675 (1978) (family is a concept; interpretation de-
pends on the group and public policies involved); Missionaries of Our Lady of
LaSalette v. Village of Whitefish Bay, 267 Wis. 609, 615, 66 N.W.2d 627, 630 (1954).
108. 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974).
109. id at 305-06, 313 N.E.2d at 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 453. Accord, Hessling v.
City of Broomfield, 193 Colo. 124, 563 P.2d 12 (1977); Oliver v. Zoning Comm'n of
Chester, 31 Conn. Sup. 197, 326 A.2d 841 (1974); Little Neck Community Ass'n v.
Working Organization for Retarded Children, 52 A.D.2d 90, 94, 383 N.Y.S.2d 364,
366 (1976); Incorporated Village of Freeport v. Ass'n for Help of Retarded Children,
94 Misc. 2d 1048, 406 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1977) a§'d 60 A.D. 2d 644, 400 N.Y.S.2d 724
(1977). But see Palm Beach Hosp., Inc. v. West Palm Beach, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY
L. REP. 18 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (group home of 10 retarded males not a family under
ordinance that prohibited more than five unrelated persons from occupying single
family unit, following Belle Terre rational relationship test).
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proach. In Garcia v. Sffrin Residential Association u °I the Ohio
Supreme Court refused to find that the purpose of a proposed group
home was for eight retarded people to share a "dwelling.""'  The
court instead ruled that the real purpose of the home was for "profes-
sional" training and education.1 12 The court relied on the fact that
the homes would be licensed, and that a "professional plan of habili-
tation" would be implemented through a director and trained person-
nel. '13 The next year, however, in Saunders v. Clark County Zoning
Department,"4 the same court found that a group home for delin-
quent boys constituted a "family." The ordinance defined family as
two or more persons living together as a single housekeeping unit.11i
These results indicate the inconsistency of litigation in this field.
Ordinances defining "family" along blood lines" 6 and those that
attempt to regulate activities inside a house create other problems for
group home siting. 1 7 The New Jersey Supreme Court in Berger v.
State" 8 invalidated an ordinance that limited "family" to those re-
lated by blood, marriage, or adoption. 19 Zoning ordinances center-
110. 63 Ohio St. 2d 259,407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 911 (1981).
111. 63 Ohio St. 2d at 268, 407 N.E.2d at 1376. See Lakeside Youth Service v.
Zoning Hearing Bd., 51 Pa. Commw. 485, 414 A.2d 1115 (1980) (home for six young
women adjudicated by juvenile court too far removed from ordinance's concept of a
single family dwelling to be considered of that use).
In spite of a state statute specifically authorizing use of such a group facility in
residential districts, the Garcia court not only found that the home would not be a
single housekeeping unit, but invalidated portions of the state statute. 63 Ohio St. 2d
at 273, 407 N.E.2d at 1379.
112. Id at 268, 407 N.E.2d at 1376.
113. Id
114. 66 Ohio St. 2d 259, 421 N.E.2d 152 (1981).
115. The court found that the family unit performed the social function of child
rearing, regardless of whether it included foster children as well as natural children.
Additionally, child rearing was held constitutionally protected against governmental
intrusion not supported by a compelling state interest. 66 Ohio St. 2d at -, 421
N.E.2d at 155-56.
116. See, e.g., Berger v. State, 71 N.J. 206, 212, 364 A.2d 993, 999 (1976) (ordi-
nance limited family to one person living alone or two or more related by blood,
marriage or adoption and living together as a single unit under one head).
117. See note 120 and accompanying text infra.
118. 71 N.J. 206, 364 A.2d 993 (1976).
119. Id at 223-24, 364 A.2d at 1002. The ordinance excluded individuals who
posed no threat to the community. Accord, Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App.
2d 69, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1962); Hessling v. City of Bloomfield, 193 Colo. 124, 563
P.2d 12 (1977); City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357
N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974); Incorporated Village of Freeport v. Ass'n for Help of Retarded
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ing on the use of a residence rather than on inquiry into the identity
of the users, are less suspect. 120 Zoning, after all, is intended to con-
trol types of housing and not the "genetic or intimate internal family
relations of human beings.''
Operators of group homes use several other methods to attack ex-
clusionary zoning. If the home cannot qualify as a family or single
housekeeping unit, it may still qualify for a conditional or special use
permit:" 2 Conditional use permits can be difficult to obtain, how-
ever, since members of the community that oppose the group home
often influence the decision. 123  Nevertheless proponents have had
some success in obtaining conditional use permits.
124
Children, 94 Misc. 2d 1048, 406 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1977), affd, 60 App. Div. 644, 400
N.Y.S.2d 724 (1977).
120. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 133, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539,
544-45, 610 P.2d 436, 441 (1980). See also Hessling v. City of Broomfield, 193 Colo.
at 128, 563 P.2d at 13; YWCA of Summit v. Board of Adjustment, 134 N.J. Super.
384, 391, 341 A.2d 356, 359 (1975), aft'd, 141 N.J. Super. 315, 358 A.2d 211 (1976)
(distinguishing between families composed of group home residents and natural fami-
lies in determining permissibility of use is to confuse power to control physical use of
premises with power to distinguish 'among occupants making some physical use of
them); Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 253-54, 281 A.2d
513, 520 (1971) ("zoning ordinances are not intended and cannot be expected to cure
or prevent most anti-social conduct in dwelling situations"); but see Garcia v. Siffrin
Residential Ass'n, 63 Ohio St. 2d at 270, 407 N.E.2d at 1377 (zoning prescribes and
regulates the conduct of individuals in their use of land, and aims to secure and pro-
mote the public welfare by restraint and compulsion); Encroachment, supra note 89 at
561.
121. City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d at 305, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
122. Special approval is usually needed from the local zoning authority for such a
use. See Lippincott, supra note 6, at 770, citing 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF
ZONING, §§ 9.14-.18 (1976). This approval is a grant of administrative permission for
uses compatible with the prescribed zone, but which may be subject to regulation for
the general welfare. See Chandler & Ross, supra note 3, at 314.
123. Chandler & Ross, supra note 3, at 314-315. The criteria for granting a spe-
cial use permit is usually based on a general welfare standard or nuisance definition.
Such vagueness gives great discretion to administrative bodies. For a description of
the procedures in obtaining a conditional use permit see Yohalem, supra note 1, at
1676 and Lippincott, supra note 6, at 775.
124. See Adams County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. City of Westminster,
196 Colo. 79, 580 P.2d 1246 (1978) (city council denied special use permit for group
home for retarded based on impermissible factors); Hessling v. City of Broomfield,
193 Colo. 124, 563 P.2d 12 (1977) (special use permit not needed as group home for
retarded children since it was a permitted one family dwelling); Children's Aid Soci-
ety v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 44 Pa. Commw. 123, 402 A.2d 1162 (1979) (pro-
posed use for children's home entitled to a special use permit, as it would have no
greater effect on conditions than would a family with six children); State ex rel Cath-
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As an alternative to seeking a conditional permit, operators may
allege that the zoning ordinances exceed municipal authority where
the state has an express policy assisting the developmentally dis-
abled.125 When a state legislature enacts a statutory scheme for plac-
ing the disabled in residential areas, this state policy preempts local
zoning ordinances excluding group homes.1 26 Many states have en-
acted such legislation.1 27 These statutes often identify the type of
community home covered by the act, the type of population served,
the number of residents allowed in the home, and the type of zoning
in which the home will be allowed. Many are based on the American
Bar Association Model Act.' 28 A California court held its state stat-
olic Family and Children's Services v. City of Bellingham, 25 Wash. App. 33, 605
P.2d 788 (1979) (conditional use permit not required for juvenile home).
125. See Zoningfor the Mentally 111, supra note 6, at 875-76. See also City of Des
Plaines v. Trottner, 34 M1. 2d 432,216 N.E.2d 116 (1966) (state general assembly never
specifically authorized adoption of zoning ordinances that penetrated deeply into the
internal composition of a single housekeeping unit); Mental Health Ass'n of Union
County, Inc. v. City of Elizabeth, 180 N.J. Super. 304, 434 A.2d 688 (1981) (city's
interpretation of ordinance as prohibiting proposed use of community home was in
direct contravention of state policy and such interpretation had to fall); Abbott House
v. Village of Tarrytown, 34 App. Div. 2d 821, 312 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1970) (ordinance
void in exceeding authority vested in village); Baptist Children's House v. Comm'r of
Industrial Bd., 51 Pa. Commw. 227, 414 A.2d 159 (1980) (board exceeded authority in
attempting to regulate group home in reliance on overbroad and doubtful application
of definition of lodging and rooming houses found in ordinance).
126. Incorporated Village of Old Field v. Introne, 104 Misc. 2d 122, 430 N.Y.S.2d
192 (1980). (local zoning powers found in state constitutions may not be susceptible
to a preemption).
See Region 10 Client Management, Inc. v. Town of Hampstead, 120 N.H. 885; 424
A.2d 207 (1980). See also City of Los Angeles v. Cal. Dep't of Health, 63 Cal. App.
3d 473, 133 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1976) (state policy applied to both "home rule" chartered
cities; group homes for retarded a matter of statewide concern); State ex re. Thelen v.
City of Missoula, 168 Mont. 375, 543 P.2d 173 (1975) (since legislature can give cities
power to regulate through zoning it can also take that power away); Township of
South Fayette v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 477 Pa. 574, 580, 385 A.2d 344, 347
(1978) (application of zoning regulations to the state depends on an examination in
each case of the nature of competing legislative grants of authority, the purposes for
which these grants were created, and the facts of the individual case). But see Garcia
v. Siffrin Residential Ass'n, 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 911 (1981) (certain sections of state law unreasonably and unlawfully limited
enforcement by municipalities of certain police powers authorized by Ohio Constitu-
tion to such municipalities).
127. For a list of state statutes see Hopperton, A State Legislative Strategyfor
Ending Exclusionary Zoning of Community Homes, 19 URBAN L. ANN. 47, 48 (1980).
128. See Developmental Disabilities State Legislative Project of the ABA Com-
mission on the Mentally Disabled, Zoningfor Community Homes, 2 MENTAL DSA-
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ute to apply to "home rule" cities.' 29 The Ohio Supreme Court has
evinced an opposite attitude. In Garcia v. Sfffrin ResidentialAssocia-
tion,13° it declared unconstitutional major portions of an Ohio statute
designed to promote group homes. The court found that the statute
unreasonably and unlawfully limited a municipality's enforcement of
those police powers authorized by the state constitution.13 1
Although state legislation is probably the most effective means of
providing needed community homes,132 these statutes are hardly per-
fect in implementation. In addition to challenges based on home
rule, some statutes still may require a special use permit, thus man-
dating local discretion. 133 There has been criticism that these statutes
focus to narrowly on zoning. 134 In viewing the problem merely as a
BILiTY L. REP. 794, 806 (ABA Model Statute, "An Act to Establish the Right to
Locate Community Homes for Developmentally Disabled Persons in the Residential
Neighborhoods of this State").
129. City of Los Angeles v. California Dep't of Health, 63 Cal. App. 3d 473, 133
Cal. Rptr. 771 (1976). Accord, State ex rel Thelen v. City of Missoula, 168 Mont.
375, 543 P.2d 173 (1975) (upholding constitutionality of special state legislation);
Zubli v. Community Mainstreaming Ass'n, 102 Misc. 2d 320, 423 N.Y.S.2d 982
(1979), aft'd, 74 App. Div. 2d 624, 425 N.Y.S.2d (1980), modfed 50 N.Y.2d 1024, 410
N.E.2d 746, 431 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1980) (upholding constitutionality of part of New
York Mental Hygiene Law).
Municipal home rule is a system of powers given to local governments by state
constitutional provisions which often include powers over zoning. Yohalem, supra
note 1, at 1678. Each home rule provision differs, as do judicial interpretations of
them. It is difficult to draw general conclusions, then, about when a state statute will
prevail over a municipal ordinance.
130. 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980).
131. Id at 271, 407 N.E.2d at 1378. The court stated that although the state's
desire to make group homes available in residential zones was laudable, the state law
had to apply uniformly to all municipalities. This particular statute had drawn an
arbitrary retroactive date, and was therefore invalid.
In Adams County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 196
Colo. at 83-84, 580 P.2d at 1249, the Supreme Court of Colorado declined to decide
the constitutionality of the state statute. The city charged that the statute attempted to
regulate a matter of purely local concern in violation of a constitutional home rule
grant. The court found, however, that the city voluntarily chose to follow the statu-
tory mandate.
132. See Comment, Zoning and Community Group Homesfor the Mentally Re-
tarded-Boon or Bust, 7 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 64, 75-76. State legislation promotes uni-
formity, which eliminates over-concentration of homes in limited areas, and also
avoids vetoes by local subdivisions.
133. See Zoningfor the Mentally 11, supra note 6, at 888-94 for a criticism of state
legislation.
134. Id at 889.
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zoning issue, many statutes incorporate the obstacles of zoning into
their solutions-problematic definitions and regulations that may be
distorted and reworked to accomplish exclusion of group homes de-
spite the legislative purpose. 135 The statutes do emphasize, however,
that state policies to provide group homes for the developmentally
disabled supercede local concerns over property values.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the Supreme Court has signaled in Young and Schad, commu-
nities can effectively regulate undesirable uses if they can provide
proof of detrimental effects. One effective mode of proof is to show
an inevitable decline in property values. As long as the community
does not totally ban the use from all zones in the muiicipality, empir-
ical proof will justify the ordinance. Courts seem willing to find ordi-
nances reasonable if given some empirical evidence, especially in
adult use cases. Group homes generally have been allowed in single
family districts, but residents have never proved a deleterious effect
on property values. The zoning power is a potent instrument for ef-
fectuating community values, but not a foolproof one.
Hope S Redmond
135. Id
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